Allocating the U.S. federal budget to the states: the impact of the president by Larcinese, Valentino et al.
  
Valentino Larcinese 
Allocating the U.S. federal budget to the 
states: the impact of the president  
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
Original citation: 
Larcinese, Valentino and Rizzo, Leonzio and Testa, Cecilia (2006) Allocating the U.S. federal 
budget to the states: the impact of the president. Journal of politics, 68 (2). pp. 447-456. 
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00419.x 
 
© 2006 Cambridge University Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3967/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: September 2012 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States:
The Impact of the President
Valentino Larcinese London School of Economics and Political Science
Leonzio Rizzo Universita’ di Ferrara and Universita’ Cattolica di Milano
Cecilia Testa Royal Holloway College, University of London
This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of the U.S. federal budget allocation to the states. Depart-
ing from the existing literature that gives prominence to Congress, we carry on an empirical investigation on the
impact of presidents during the period 1982–2000. Our findings suggest that federal budget allocation is affected by
presidential politics. States that heavily supported the incumbent president in past presidential elections tend to
receive more funds, while marginal and swing states are not rewarded. Party affiliation also matters since states
whose governor belong to the same party of the president receive more federal funds, while states opposing the pres-
ident’s party in Congressional elections are penalized. These results show that presidents are engaged in tactical dis-
tribution of federal funds and also provide good evidence in support of partisan theories of budget allocation.
by the Budget and Accounting act of 1921 that began
a long-lasting period of domination of presidency
over Congress. Following the escalating conflict with
the Nixon administration, the Congress tried then to
regain control over the budget through the Budget
Impoundment and Control act of 1974. According to
Schick, the 1974 reform had “the potential of altering
presidential-Congress relationship contributing to a
resurgence of Congress” (1979, 96). A number of
scholars, however, argue that the president is still 
an influential player (Edwards 1980; Kiewiet and 
Krehbiel 2002) mainly because of his veto power
(Copeland 1983; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988;
McCarty 2000; Rohde and Simon 1985), since “merely
the threat of a veto is often enough to force Congress
to tailor a bill to conform to administration wishes”
(Cummings and Wise 1981, 368). Historical evidence
of presidential influence on the territorial distribution
of federal funds has been provided by several studies
on the New Deal program. In particular, Wallis (1987)
and Wright (1974) have found that states with high
volatility of presidential vote received more federal
support, which is consistent with the idea that the
president might try to target swing voters. On the
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“For republican governors, it means we have an ear in
the White House, we have a number we can call, we have
access that we wouldn’t have otherwise had, and that’s of
course helpful” (Gov. Mitt Romney, Washington Post,
Monday, November 22, 2004).1
T
he allocation of the federal budget in the United
States is the outcome of a complex process
involving numerous institutional players. A vast
theoretical and empirical literature has devoted a for-
midable effort to the study of this process. The exist-
ing empirical contributions primarily focus on
congressional influence via powerful individual repre-
sentatives, such as for example committee members,
or via political parties. The executive, however, also
plays an important role in the budget formation: the
president initiates the process by sending a proposal
to the Congress and, once the budget has been
approved, retains a veto power that can be overridden
only by a qualified majority equal to two-thirds of
Congress.
Historically, the balance of power between presi-
dent and Congress over the budget has been subject
to important changes. The authority of the executive
over the initiation of the budget was first established
1Interview with Republican governor Mitt Romney, following the reelection of G. W. Bush in November 2004.
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other hand, Anderson and Tollison (1991) and Couch
and Shugart (1998) find a positive correlation between
Roosevelt’s share of votes in 1932 and spending at state
level2 that is compatible with the hypothesis of
rewarding loyal rather than swing voters. Finally, Fish-
back, Kantor, and Wallis (2003) and Fleck (2001) find
evidence in support of both hypotheses.3
While the New Deal has received great attention,
there is a lack of empirical studies on presidential
influence after the 1974 reform. Despite the vibrant
theoretical debate on the respective roles of Congress
and president, the empirical literature on contempo-
rary federal budget allocation has paid attention
mainly to the legislative power. To address the short-
comings of this one-sided approach, this paper inves-
tigates whether the president has a systematic impact
on the allocation of the federal budget to the states. In
doing so, we provide a comprehensive empirical test
of the existing theoretical models of tactical redistrib-
ution. Our results add new significant insights to the
conspicuous empirical literature on federal budget
allocation and are of extreme relevance to both the
theoretical study of American political institutions
and the debate on possible reforms of the budget
process.
From a theoretical point of view, the executive
may have several reasons to sway the federal budget
allocation away from a purely social welfare maximiz-
ing objective (McCarty 2000). Namely, the president
may use budget allocation to enhance his reelection
chances either by targeting swing states or by reward-
ing his supporters. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987, 1993)
provide theoretical models explaining why political
actors should redistribute funds to marginal and
swing states in order to maximize their chances of
winning elections. Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue
instead that, because of the ideological relationship
between voters and candidates, more funds should be
allocated where policymakers have larger support. In
particular, the targeting of loyal voters can be seen as
a safer investment as compared to aiming for swing
voters. Hence, risk-adverse political actors who want
to maximize their chances of winning elections 
should allocate more funds to loyal states. Dixit and
Londregan (1996) provide an alternative model where
politicians face incentives to target both swing and
loyal voters. On the one hand, moderate voters, who
are indifferent between two parties, can more easily be
bought; on the other, core supporters can be targeted
in a more efficient way because parties know their
preferences better.
Besides targeting specific groups of voters, the
president could also try to further his legislative
agenda by directing spending to specific legislators.
Moreover, “as a leader of his party, he may feel the
pressure to favor legislative districts controlled by
members of his party” (McCarty 2000). Assuming that
party reputation is a public good for individual party
members, Cox and McCubbins (1993) provide a the-
oretical explanation for cooperation among represen-
tatives belonging to the same party.4 Along the same
line, Dasgupta, Dhillon, and Dutta (2004) argue that
when the electoral returns from spending are shared
between state and central government, then transfer-
ring funds to a governor of the opponent party 
generates a “leakage” effect whereby the central 
government looses part of the electoral benefit from
spending. Finally, if state governments have some dis-
cretion in the way funds are spent, then the federal
administration could prefer to allocate more funds to
governors with the same policy preferences. All this
seems to suggest that the president has incentives to
sway the allocation of federal funds in the direction of
“friendly” administrators.
This study will test these alternative theories of
presidential influence. In particular, we will first esti-
mate the effect of the presidential electoral race on the
budget allocation to find out whether the president
rewards his supporters or whether he targets states
that are marginal or swing in presidential elections.
Second, to uncover whether the president diverts
federal funds toward states controlled by members of
his party, we will estimate the effect of partisan align-
ment between the president and the state governors
and/or state representatives.
The impact of the president as a party leader and,
more generally, the distributive effects of cooperation
between representatives belonging to the same party,
are important theoretical questions that have not been
explored yet by the empirical literature on partisan
budgeting, that tends instead to focus on the role of
parties inside Congress. Among the contributions on
congressional partisan budgeting, Levitt and Snyder
(1995) find that, when Congress was dominated by
democratic majorities, outlays at the district level were
2Anderson and Tollison (1991) also find evidence of committee
influence on New Deal spending.
3For an overview of the literature on New Deal spending see
Couch and Shugart (1998) and Fishback, Kantor, and Wallis
(2003).
4The evidence reported by the media on cooperation between
party members is abundant. During presidential campaigns a
huge emphasis is placed, for example, on the ability of governors
to deliver the votes of their state.
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positively correlated with the district share of demo-
cratic votes.5 Similarly, Carsey and Rundquist (1999)
find that states represented by Democrats on a defense
committee receive more military procurement awards.
Bickers and Stein (2000) find that the Republican
control of the 104th Congress altered the composition
of federal outlays in favor of programs that are 
more compatible with the interests of Republican 
representatives.6
One important advantage of our empirical analy-
sis is that it relies on panel data on federal outlays over
a relatively long time span. The panel structure allows
us to use state-fixed effects to account for state-level
unobserved heterogeneity and identify the effect of
the relevant political and economic variables.7 Since
the president, unlike most other individual players,
can exercise his influence on any budgetary aggregate,
we decided to focus our attention on total federal
outlays. This approach has its own drawbacks but, for
our purposes, also provides substantial advantages.
Focusing on very specific aggregates, as most literature
does, makes it possible to shed light on specific forms
of influence and to be very precise on them. This is
particularly true for studies on committees, where dis-
tortions are more often found on specific spending
programs. It is, however, quite possible that the dis-
tortions introduced by different actors with limited
influence may offset each other leaving a state without
a real advantage in the overall allocation of federal
funds. Since the presidential influence is not limited
to particular aggregates, then it is more likely that a
state can be favored in the overall budget allocation
for reasons related to presidential politics. Therefore,
total federal spending is the place where the presiden-
tial influence is more likely to be detected. Focusing
on whether a state receives, on aggregate, more federal
funds, we are of course capturing only a particular
channel through which political actors may divert
funds toward their constituencies. The composition of
the budget is another instrument that can be used to
favor interests located in a given constituency, as it is
shown by Bickers and Stein (2000).
While we are primarily interested in the role of the
president, we also incorporate into the analysis the
other relevant institutional players (Congress and
committees) because excluding some explanatory
variables in the regressions may lead to the well-
known problem of omitted variable bias.8 Therefore,
we check the robustness of our results by simultane-
ously estimating in the same regressions the impact of
several channels of political influence that, according
to previous studies, may crucially affect federal budget
allocation. Following Atlas et al. (1995) and Lee
(1998), we control for overrepresentation of small
states in Congress. Furthermore, individual represen-
tatives occupying key positions in the budget process
can convey disproportionate amounts of money to
their districts (Fenno 1973; Kiewiet and McCubbins
1988). According to several scholars, committees are
very influential in determining the budget allocation
(Shepsle and Weingast 1987) since they have an
advantage both in terms of their agenda-setting power
(McKelvey and Ordeshook 1980) and in terms of
information and competence9 (Krehbiel 1991). Hence,
we follow the empirical literature on committee influ-
ence10 and introduce committee membership in our
analysis.
To briefly summarize our main results, we find
that the president has an important impact on the
allocation of the budget to the states. In particular,
states that ideologically lean towards the president,
i.e., states with a high share of presidential votes or
with a governor belonging to the party of the presi-
dent, tend to be rewarded with more funds. On the
other hand, states with a close presidential electoral
race and states that either changed political affiliation
5Evidence of a bias in favour of democratic districts is also
reported by Alvarez and Saving (1997), Kiewiet and McCubbins
(1985) and Owens and Wade (1984). Some recent literature has
investigated the role of parties on budget allocation also in other
countries. Dasgupta, Dhillon, and Dutta (2004) find that Indian
states ruled by the same party that controls the central goverment
receive more grants, while Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) find
that the Swedish regions that are “swing” in the national elections
receive a higher share of a specific transfer program.
6They find, for example, a remarkable increase in the pro-business
contingent liabilities.
7When data on specific years are used instead, it is hard to say if
the results obtained are merely due to particular features of the
data considered or to proper and long-lasting political influence.
8When different explanatory variables are correlated, as it seems
reasonable to expect in most cases, omitting relevant players could
deliver biased estimates of the impact of those considered.
9Weingast and Marshall (1988) argue that committees are the
devices that make logrolling work, by facilitating the trade of influ-
ence in the absence of a spot market for the exchanging of support.
10The empirical literature on committee influence is vast and,
although the results are sometimes mixed, committee influence is
usually found on specific spending categories rather than large
aggregates. Among the numerous studies on committees see
Aldrich and Rohde (2000), Alvarez and Saving (1997), Anderson
and Tollison (1991), Bond, Bonneau, and Cottril (2004), Carsey
and Rundquist (1999), Ferejohn (1974), Goss (1972), Kiel and
McKinzie (1983), Knight (2005), Levitt and Poterba (1999),
Owens and Wade (1984), Plott (1968), Ray (1981), Rich (1989),
Ritt (1976), Rundquist and Griffith (1976), and Strom (1975). For
an overview on the Committee influence literature see Bond et al.
(2004).
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in the most recent election or that are historically
volatile do not receive more money. Hence, overall our
analysis suggests that the president is a relevant player
as he can direct more funding toward those states that
are run by “friendly” governors and that have large
groups of “core supporters.” Finally, our analysis indi-
cates that partisanship plays an important role since
governors politically aligned with the president receive
more resources and Congress members opposing the
president bring less funds to their states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. The next section describes our data set and
lays out our empirical approach. We then present our
main results, and, in the last section, we provide our
conclusions.
Data and Methodology
Following the theoretical literature on partisan budg-
eting (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Lon-
dregan 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, 1993) and
presidential influence (Kiewiet and Krehbiel 2002;
McCarty 2000) the hypotheses we want to test may be
summarized as follows:
H1: federal funds are disproportionately targeted to
states that are marginal and swing in presiden-
tial elections (swing bias);
H2: federal funds are disproportionately targeted to
states where the president is supported by a large
share of the electorate (ideological bias);
H3: party alignment of state governors and/or Con-
gress representatives with the executive increases
the receipt of federal funds (party alignment).
For completeness, we also check what is the
impact of the alignment of governors and state
representatives with Congress majorities.
We use data on federal outlays for the 48 U.S.
continental states from 1982 to 2000.11 Table A1 in the
online statistical appendix reports average per capita
federal outlays during the period 1982–2000
(expressed in real dollars for the year 2000). It is
immediately clear that the differences in spending can
be substantial. An average resident of Virginia, for
example, has received every year almost $2,700 more
than an average resident of Wisconsin. While this gap
can be entirely due to the needs and characteristics of
the respective populations, it is legitimate to ask how
much of this difference can be due to purely political
factors. For this purpose we estimate the following
equation:12
(1)
where FEDEXPst is the real per-capita federal expen-
diture (outlays) in state s at time t. As in all the sub-
sequent regressions, we include state-fixed effects and
year dummies. Zst is a vector that includes real income
per capita, state population, unemployment rate, per-
centage of citizens aged 65 or above, and percentage
of citizens between 5 and 17 years old. We keep these
explanatory variables in all the regressions as standard
economic and demographic controls. Finally, Pisw rep-
resents the set of institutional and political variables
under consideration.13
It is important to point out that in the U.S. budget
process there is a lag between the appropriation of
federal funds and the moment when these are actually
spent. This is relevant when estimating the effect of
particular institutional and political variables, since
current federal outlays have normally been appropri-
ated in previous budgetary years. Delays should there-
fore be taken into account. Hence, we introduce lagged
values for Pist, since past policymakers are responsible
for current outlays. To give the right weight to lagged
independent variables explaining current outlays, we
use weighted averages of lagged Pis, where the weights
are determined by the spend-out rates utilized in offi-
cial forecasts. The reported results are based on the
assumption that 60% of appropriated expenditure is
spent within one year and the rest two years later.14
Hence, we regress outlays at time t on the weighted
average of two lagged variables, i.e., Pisw = .6 * P
i
st−1 + .4
* Pist−2.
Hypotheses 1 and 2. We begin our analysis by con-
sidering the role of electoral competition in the pres-
idential electoral race. Hence, we compare the relative
FEDEXP
s t
st s t sw
i
st st= + + + +
= =
a b eq q1P Z ,
, . . . ; , . . . ;1 48 1982 2000
11As customary, Alaska, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii have
been excluded. Usually those states tend to be excluded to facili-
tate comparison with previous research. Another reason, and
probably a better one, however, is that they attract a dispropor-
tionate amount of federal spending for either aministrative
reasons (DC) or strategic reasons (Alaska and Hawaii receive a
substantial share of defense spending). This could render the
political motivations behind an observed distribution less 
recognizable.
12All equations have been estimated by using Stata 8.2.
13Summary statistics are reported online in the statistical 
appendix, http://www.journalofpolitics.org.
14See Horney and Greenstein (2000) for estimates of spendout
rates. Official spendout rates are estimated each year by the CBO
and OMB but they can display substantial variations. For this
reason we have considered several possibilities, both increasing the
first-year spendout rate up to 80% and increasing the number of
lags up to five years. Our results show very little sensitivity to such
variations.
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impact of the closeness of the presidential elections in
each state with that of the share of votes obtained by
the president in the last election.15 A negative sign of
the closeness variable should be regarded as support
for the idea that the president tends to direct resources
to marginal states in order to increase his chances of
reelection. A positive sign of the share of presidential
votes should instead be seen as evidence that incum-
bents tend to reward states that show their support in
elections. We also take into account the fact that not
all states have the same weight in presidential elections
by including the number of electoral votes per capita
by state.
The closeness of the past election is, however, not
necessarily the best measure to identify swing states.
We, therefore, generate an indicator of long-term
swing which is based on the number of times a state
swung its support from a party to another in the last
four presidential elections.16
Hypotheses 3. As previously discussed, the parti-
sanship of different representatives can have an
important effect on budget allocation since coopera-
tion between different political actors belonging to the
same party is likely to occur. In particular, the presi-
dent, acting as a party leader, may divert funds toward
state governors and state representatives belonging to
his own party. Hence, we consider a series of dummy
variables to capture various levels of partisan align-
ment between central powers and state governments.
We first create three dummy variables to reflect the
political alignment of state governors with, respec-
tively, the president and the majorities in the House
and in the Senate. In a further specification we also
consider the possibility that the allocation of funds to
a given state is facilitated by party alignment between
the governor and the majority of state delegates to the
House or the governor and both senators. We then
consider the potential effect of having the president
and a majority of state delegates in the House, or the
president and both senators from a given state,
belonging to the same party. Finally, we consider the
potential advantage of having a majority of state del-
egates to the House belonging to the House majority
party or having both senators belonging to the Senate
majority.
We are aware that testing our hypotheses sepa-
rately has a major limitation because, by considering
one element at time, we can miss relevant correlations
and incorrectly estimate some effects. For this reason
we run a regression including all the Pisw vectors in one
equation of the form:
(2)
The results we get from equation (2) provide the
big picture that is missed when focussing on specific
channels of influence and provide an important
robustness check.
Results
Swing and Ideological Bias
In Table 1 we focus on presidential elections to test the
swing-voter hypothesis and contrast it with the poten-
tial presence of ideological bias. Column 1 shows that,
while the share of presidential votes in the past elec-
tion displays a positive and significant coefficient,
the closeness of the same election has no significant
effect.17 In column 2 we consider the swing variable
and we find again no evidence in support of the
swing-voter hypothesis, while the share of presidential
vote has always a positive and significant effect.18
Depending on the specification considered, the differ-
ence in spending between a state with maximum share
of presidential vote and a state with the minimum of
FEDEXPst s t
i
sw
i
st st
i
= + + + +∑a b eq q1 2P Z ,
15Hypothesis 1 and 2 are different because, although correlated,
the closeness and the presidential share of votes measure two sep-
arate electoral phenomena. First, they can be different when there
are more than two candidates. More importantly, however, they
are different because, while an electoral race can be equally “close”
in states where the president has won or lost to the opponent, the
share of presidential votes will necessarily be different when the
president wins.
16We have also used two other measures of electoral volatility. One
is a moving average of the frequency of swings from one party to
the other that starts from the 1964 election. The other is an indi-
cator of short-term volatility represented by a dummy equal to one
for the states that switched their support in the last election. Our
results do not change when we use such alternative measures.
Further details can be found in the online statistical appendix.
17Concerning the economic variables, states with higher income
per capita receive significantly less, as do states with larger popu-
lation. The percentage of aged population also has a positive and
significant effect. The percentage of children in schooling age has
instead a negative and significant effect, while the unemployment
rate is completely uncorrelated with aggregate spending per
capita. The signs and significance of those coefficients remain sub-
stantially the same in all the subsequent specifications.
18One obvious concern is that the significance of our estimates
could be heavily conditioned by multicollinearity among the inde-
pendent variables. To verify that the correlations of our predictors
do not significantly inflate the estimation of their standard errors,
we calculate the Variance Inflation Factor for all the regressions we
present in this work. Here, as well as in all the subsequent regres-
sions, we find that that multicollinearity has a very limited impact
on our results. A description of the methodology and detailed
results are reported online in the statistical appendix.
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such a share goes from $536 (column 1) to $908
(column 2) per capita per year, which implies that one
standard deviation in the share of presidential vote is
worth $97–164. These findings are in line with some
of the existing literature. For example, Anderson and
Tollison (1991) and Couch and Shugart (1998) find a
positive correlation between spending at the state level
and Roosevelt’s share of votes in 1932, and Wright
(1974) finds no effect of the closeness of the presi-
dential race.19
To summarize, we find that the ideological bias
toward safe states is substantial in terms of both mag-
nitude and statistical significance. We do not find
instead any evidence of the refined targeting of swing
and marginal states that some formal models seem to
suggest. Assuming that electors cast their votes
depending on the amount of spending they receive
and also on their ideological affinity to a party, the
swing voter bias should come from the fact that mod-
erate voters (who are indifferent between two parties) 
can be more easily convinced to switch their vote 
in favor of the party that has rewarded them with
spending. However, as Dixit and Londregan (1995)
point out, the electoral return from a dollar of spend-
ing is higher when targeted to an electorate whose
preferences the politician understands well. Hence,
although the vote of the moderate electors may be
“cheaper” to buy, the informational advantage and
ability of parties to target funds more efficiently to
their supporters can explain why allocating more
spending to states with many loyal voters can deliver
a better electoral return than targeting areas with
many swing voters.
Party Alignment
In this section we explore the effect of partisan align-
ment between central and state government. Our
analysis provides support for the idea that partisan-
ship matters and that political actors exchange favors
and policies within the party boundaries. Column 1
of Table 2 shows that the coefficient of the alignment
between the president and the governor in a given
state has a positive and statistically significant impact.
The size of the coefficient is also relevant, implying a
transfer of approximately $135–138 per capita per
year. On the other hand, we find that the effect of
alignment of governors with the majority in either
chamber of Congress is not significant. This is espe-
cially important because it shows both the relevance
of party affiliation at different levels of governance
and the prominent role of the president in the budget
process as a party leader.
In column 2, we include other alignment vari-
ables. The significance and magnitude of the align-
ment between governors and the president appears
unaffected by the introduction of new variables. Other
alignment variables appear to have no statistically 
significant impact. The only exception is represented
by having a majority of state delegates to the House
belonging to the same party of the president. This
again suggests that the widespread emphasis on the
role of the House in the allocation of the federal
budget can obscure the important role played by both
the president and the party affiliation.20
These results turn out to be very robust to differ-
ent specifications where the three hypotheses (swing
voter, ideological bias, and party allignment) are con-
T 1 Swing and Ideological Bias
Dependent variable: real per capita federal outlays,
1982–2000
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable fedexp fedexp
Share of vote for the 1,821.43 1,076.899
incumbent president (2.75)*** (2.34)**
Closeness −615.15
(1.46)
Swing −139.3107
(1.25)
Electoral votes per capita 386.04 345.1779
(1.72)* (1.55)
Observations 864 864
R-squared .9353 .9347
OLS regressions; Robust t statistics in parentheses (*significant at
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%).
In all regressions the following controls are included: income,
unemployment, population, percentage of aged, percentage of
children, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, constant term.
Detailed definitions of all variables are reported in the online sta-
tistical appendix.
19Our results are also consistent with the findings of Strömberg
(2004), who shows how, when state fixed effects are included in
the regressions, evidence that swing states received more federal
support under the New Deal vanishes.
20To take into account possible multicollinearity we also run sep-
arate regressions for different forms of alignment. The results
(available online in the statistical appendix) remain unchanged,
with the exception of the alignment between the majority of state
delegates and the House Majority, which has now a negative
impact. This is not surprising if we consider that the House has
been mostly opposed to the president in the period we consider
(with the exception of the period 1993–94). To confirm this, when
we directly include alignments with the president (column 2 of
Table 2), this result vanishes.
  ..     :      
sidered at the same time.21 Our robustness checks
confirm that some states receive disproportionate
amounts of money for reasons essentially linked to
politics and to the budget allocation process. The
results concerning the president, as well as the support
for partisan theories, turn out to be particularly
robust.
The role of parties in American politics has been
reconsidered in recent research, and new evidence
about party cohesion casts some doubts on the
common view that American parties are weak organ-
izations, with limited ideological divide (Rohde 1991).
If parties are influential, then the president, as a party
leader, may favor legislative districts controlled by
members of his party. By showing that the president
is able to target more funds toward states that are con-
trolled by state governors belonging to his party, we
find good evidence in support of the theoretical liter-
ature that gives prominence to political parties and
party leaders in shaping public policies. Consistent
with Levitt and Snyder (1995), who find that demo-
cratic districts received more federal spending under
the Carter administration than under the Reagan
administration, we also find that state representatives
opposing the president bring less funds to their states
as compared to representatives aligned with the 
president.
Concerning the relationship between the presi-
dent and the state governors, Carsey and Wright
(1998) find that votes in gubernatorial elections cru-
cially depend on presidential approval rate. On the
other hand, governors can play an important role in
presidential elections as suggested by the attention the
media devote to the ability of state governors to
“deliver” the vote of their state. The casual evidence on
the privileged partisan link between president and
governors is abundant.22 The endorsement of gover-
nors also plays a fundamental role in the selection of
presidential candidates during primaries23 and the
governors’ associations underline their important role
in shaping federal policies.24 Uncovering that the par-
tisanship of state governors and president is an impor-
tant determinant of the distribution of federal funds
to the states, our study provides evidence of an effec-
tive link between governors and the president through
political parties.
T 2 Alignment
Dependent variable: real per capita federal outlays,
1982–2000
(1) (2)
Dependent Variable fedexp fedexp
Alignment Governor-President 134.904 137.917
(2.35)** (2.52)**
Alignment Governor-House 100.720 100.078
(1.54) (1.56)
Alignment Governor-Senate 12.3287 36.8956
(.28) (.86)
Alignment between the  −5.3423
Governor and the majority (.11)
of state delegates in the
House
Alignment between the −99.7257
Governor and the two (1.60)
state senators
Alignment between the  22.1627
President and the two state (.39)
senators
Alignment between the  235.273
President and the majority (3.02)***
of state delegates in the
House
Alignment between the 71.001
majority of state delegates (.93)
in the House and the House 
majority
Alignment between the two 36.5556
senators of the state and the (.76)
Senate majority
Observations 864 864
R-squared .9273 .9326
OLS regressions; Robust t statistics in parentheses (*significant at
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%).
In all regressions the following controls are included: income,
unemployment, population, percentage of aged, percentage of
children, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, constant term. The
alignment variables are dummies equal to one when partisan
alignment occurs and zero otherwise. Detailed definitions of all
variables are reported in the online statistical appendix.
21The results of the robustness check, obtained by estimating equa-
tion (2), are reported and discussed extensively in the online sta-
tistical appendix.
22See, for example, the opening quote from the interview of the
governor of Massachusetts appeared on the Washington Post,
Monday, November 22, 2004.
23The Republican Governors’ Association reports that “Presiden-
tial candidates hailing from out of state can trade on a governor’s
name cachet and fund-raising network, while governors can gain
a powerful ally in the Oval Office if their horse wins the race”
(Larry Sabato on the interview by Kenneth P. Vogel, Wednesday
June 18, 2003, The News Tribune).
24Both the Republican and Democratic Governors’ Associations
explicitly state on their web site their intent to influence federal
policies.
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Conclusions
A common view about the U.S. federal budget is that
the president influences the big macroeconomic
aggregates while individual congressmen bargain over
the territorial distribution of funds in order to bring
resources to their constituents. This study shows that
presidents are also engaged in tactical distribution of
federal funds to the states. This conclusion is sup-
ported by a number of findings concerning the rela-
tion of federal spending with both the results of
presidential elections and the party affiliation of the
president. States that display large support for the
presidential party tend to be rewarded. States where
the governor belongs to the same party of the presi-
dent receive more funds, while states that have a del-
egation in the House which is predominantly opposed
to the president tend to be penalized. These results
also seem to show that parties are important players
and that the president tend to act as a party leader.
Congressional pork barrel is often viewed as a
common and almost inevitable consequence of repre-
sentative democracy where elected representatives use
federal funds in order to buy political support.
However, presidents themselves, as elected representa-
tives of broader constituencies, are not immune from
the same problem. Starting from the 1980s, all presi-
dencies have put forward proposals for the introduc-
tion of presidential line-item veto25 and expanded
impoundment control aiming at increasing the power
of the president to control unnecessary congressional
pork-barrel spending. These proposals have raised the
suspicion of a possible change in the balance of power
between executive and Congress mainly because the
impoundment power, before the 1974 budget act, has
been extensively used by the presidency to override
congressional budget priorities. However, whether this
shift in power might be desirable or not depends,
among other factors, on whether the executive could
be a more effective body in controlling pork-barrel
spending. Our study casts some doubts on the disci-
plining role of the executive and suggests that the
arguments for increasing the power of the president
on budgetary matters should be taken with due
caution.
Our findings also shed light on alternative theo-
ries of electoral competition. We find that states with
a large share of presidential supporters get more
funds, but we do not find that more federal monies
are allocated to marginal or swing states. This evi-
dence, while corroborating the hypothesis of ideolog-
ical bias formalized by existing theoretical models,
also suggests that we need further theoretical research
on the ongoing link between parties and “core sup-
porters.” If one investigates the reasons behind voters’
loyalty, then it is hard to justify why loyal voters should
support political actors that systematically allocate
funds to the advantage of swing voters. Hence, in a
context of repeated interactions between the elec-
torate and the politicians, loyalty in itself can be sus-
tained only if political actors build a reputation of
rewarding their supporters. The need for such a long-
term perspective provides a further rationale for the
importance of parties in the process of allocating
federal resources.
Further empirical investigation is also necessary
to gain more insights on presidential pork barrel. In
particular, an analysis of disaggregated spending cat-
egories could be useful in order to find out if there are
budget aggregates which are more prone to presiden-
tial manipulation and whether different spending 
categories are used to achieve different goals.26 To 
conclude, by using panel data on a relatively long time
span and by testing various theories on the same data
set, we reach new and robust findings which help in
evaluating current models of tactical redistribution
and possible reforms of the U.S. budget process.
Having established that presidents are involved in tac-
tical redistribution in cooperation with other institu-
tional players, we suggest new directions for further
research where more attention should be granted to
the interplay of different political actors.
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